顾客教育悖论及其内在机制:来自基金投资者的实证研究

Customer Education Paradox and Mechanism from the Perspective of MOA: Evidence from the Fund Investors

对于产品较为复杂和专业的公司而言,顾客教育能够有效实现顾客价值让渡和提高竞争优势。但是,现有研究中关于顾客教育和顾客忠诚之间矛盾的结论(即顾客教育悖论现象),让很多企业在实施顾客教育时摇摆不定。引入动机—机会—能力模型,通过对某基金公司投资者的调研问卷,结果表明,顾客教育具有双刃的效果:一方面会通过降低投资者的转换动机,提高其忠诚度;另外一方面通过提高投资者的转换能力和转换机会感知,降低其忠诚度。此外还发现,投资者的转换动机能够调节转换能力、转换机会和投资者忠诚之间的关系,即当投资者的转换动机较低时,转换机会和转换能力并不会削弱投资者的忠诚。本研究为相关企业在顾客教育的实施过程中如何趋利避害提供了现实指导意义。

For company offering complex and professional products, customer education will be useful to realize customer value transfer and gain competitive advantage. But the unresolved customer education paradox has hampered the strategic decision on customer education implementation. Through introduction of motivation-opportunity-ability model and investigation of fund investor, the result demonstrates that, customer education is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it will improve loyalty through switching motivation; on the other hand, it will decrease loyalty through switching ability and opportunity. Furthermore, switching motivation will moderate the relationship between switching ability, switching opportunity and loyalty. This paper shed some light on the implementation of customer education.