转售价格维持、不对称信息与反垄断执法

Resale Price Maintenance, Asymmetric Information and Antitrust Enforcement

本文在一个纵向约束模型中考虑销售努力的横向外部性和信息不对称问题,分析了最优的两部收费(two-part tariff)和转售价格维持(resale price maintenance,RPM)合同的特征,给出了两种纵向约束合同的福利影响及其对反垄断执法的政策含义。在信息不对称情况下,RPM总能给上游企业带来更高的利润。但从社会福利的角度看,两种纵向约束方式下努力水平和最终产品销量的比较取决于横向外部性的大小和信息不对称的程度。当横向外部性问题更严重时,RPM下努力程度更高,产品销量更高;当信息不对称问题更严重时,两部收费下努力程度更高,产品销量更高。因此,反垄断政策在处置RPM问题时需要权衡横向外部性和信息不对称问题的严重程度。

This paper investigates the optimal two-part tariff contract and resale price maintenance (hereafter, RPM) contract in a vertical restraints model with horizontal externality and asymmetric information. The comparison between the welfare effects of the two contracts has important implication to the antitrust enforcement. Under asymmetric information the upstream producer always prefers RPM to two-part tariff contract. As far as social welfare is concerned, the impacts of RPM on the downstream retailers‘efforts and consumers’ surplus are ambiguous, which depend on the tradeoff between the significance of horizontal externality and that of informational asymmetry. When the externality problem dominates, RPM brings more efforts and higher consumers’ surplus than two-part tariff, while the reverse happens when the problem of asymmetric information is more serious. Thus, we argue that the antitrust enforcement on RPM should be under the rule of reason and the antitrust authority should put emphasis on the tradeoff between horizontal externality and informational asymmetry.