摘要
权力腐败是权力的非责任化和权力的权利化。权力腐败的本质是剥削 ,这种剥削是通过追求最大化的“非生产性利润”而形成权力资本实现的。遏制腐败 ,可以从权力成为“寻租”、“设租”对象的诱因 ,即权力不当干预或进入市场 ,导致权钱交易腐败现象恶性发作上去认识。也可以从经济分析法学的角度 ,即通过成本分析进行遏制 ,因为权力腐败都是需要承担风险和支付成本的 ,只有国家法治措施达到腐败成本大于腐败收益时 ,才能有效预防和遏制权力的腐败。
Power corruption is the power being non-responsiblized and the power becoming rights. The essence of power corruption is the exploitation realized by pursuing the maximization of 'non-production profits' which therefore form power capital. In order to check corruption, it can be understood that the cause for power becoming the object of 'rent seeking' and 'rent setting', that is power unwarrantedly intervening or entering into market, leads to the phenomena of the exchange of power and money taking place seriously. It can also be checked by cost analysis from the angle of economic analysis jurisprudence, because all power corruptions need to bear risks and pay for costs. Only if the state measures of constitutionality reached the degree that corruption costs are more than corruption incomes, power corruption can be effectively prevented and checked.
出处
《政法论坛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2001年第4期126-132,共7页
Tribune of Political Science and Law
关键词
权力剥削
寻租
设租
法律成本
Power Exploitation
Rent Seeking
Rent Setting
Cost of Law