绿色供应链管理中有举报行为的政企博弈分析

Game Analysis between Governments and Corporations with Prosecution in Green Supply Chain Management

研究绿色供应链管理中有举报行为的政企博弈,从而为我国政府主管部门在制定具体监管政策及措施时提供一个模型与定量的方法。应用博弈论方法来研究绿色供应链中的政企关系,为绿色供应链管理提供了一些有益的启发。对模型做了基本假设,考虑了消费者的举报行为,根据不同情况,分别得出纳什均衡解和混合策略最优化解。对比分析了是否存在举报行为的最优策略解,阐述了举报行为对博弈双方的策略选择的影响。总结了模型的最优策略解,并在此基础提出了政府主管部门在具体监管策略制定上如何运用该定量分析工具。

Study the game between governments and corporations in which exist impeaching and implementation green supply chain,so that,we can advance a model and a quantitative methodology for the superintending department of our country,and then,they can make supervising policy and measures.Putting the game theory in the study of green supply chain between governments and corporations provides many illutinations for us.We propose the basic hypotheses,and take the prosecution of the consumers into account.According to different situations,we reach the Nash equilibrium solution and the mixed strategies solution.Further we analysis the best strategy solution and judge whether there are impeaching in the game.Also,we illustrate the effect of impeaching to strategy selection. At last,we summarize the best strategy of the model,and illustrate how to apply it by the government superintending department.