物流企业参与下的库存质押融资中的委托代理问题研究

The Research of Principal-Agent Problem in Inventory Financing with Logistics Enterprises Participating

本文在分析物流企业参与下的库存质押融资中银行与企业的收益的基础上,给出了银行和企业的委托代理模型,确定了代理成本。通过对比在信息对称和信息不对称情况下,投资激励与物流企业监管下银行的收益,确定了物流企业在库存质押融资中的监管程度的取值范围,说明了物流企业在这一融资模式中的作用,给出了各方由于信息不对称而付出的成本费用。

Based on the analysis of the earnings of banks and finance companies in inventory financing with logistics enterprises participating,we give the principal-agent model of bank and company,and determine the cost of agents. By comparing in the case of information symmetry and asymmetry,the income of bank with investment incentives and suppervised by logistics enterprises respectively,determine the supervision range and the effect of logistics enterprises. Finally,we give the cost of all the participants due to information asymmetry.