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成员参与利润分配的供应链信息协调模型研究 被引量:4

The Research for Supply Chain Information Coordination Model of Members Participation in Profits Distribution
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摘要 供应链中的委托代理关系主要体现在成员企业与盟主企业因信息沟通和行动不对称而构成的道德风险,所以必须通过激励机制的引入,促使成员企业努力促进信息在供应链中的准确及时传递。本文主要从委托代理的基本模型出发,设立了一个通过让成员企业参与供应链剩余利润分配的激励模型来促进供应链中的信息沟通与协调行为。该模型通过引入分配系数、通过评价乘数对分配系数进行调整、导入奖惩函数等多种分析方法,从而提高了激励准确程度,成功的降低了代理成本。 The agency relationship in supply chain mainly refelcted that corporate members and the chief run the moral risk for asymmetric information communication and action.So it must be introduced incentives to promote the delivery of information in supply chain accurately and timely within corporate members.Based on the basic model of the agency,this article set up an incentive model for corporate members to paticipate in the distribution of the remaining profit to promote the information communication and coordination act in supply chain. Through introducing the coefficient,adjusting the coefficient by the valuation of the multiplier,importing the rewards and punishments function and other analytical methods,so as to enhance the accuracy of the incentives and successfully reduce the agency cost.
作者 范林根
出处 《中国管理科学》 CSSCI 2008年第S1期467-472,共6页 Chinese Journal of Management Science
关键词 委托-代理关系 供应链 信息协调 激励模型 principal-agent relationship supply chain information coordination incentive model
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参考文献10

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