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企业外部招聘行为的演化博弈分析 被引量:17

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Firm External Recruitment
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摘要 当企业对拥有一定技术、知识和能力的员工需求远大于当前的人力资源供给,那么就需要招聘新员工,企业必须吸纳必要的员工来确保整个组织的持续运作。根据招聘对象来源的不同,可将招聘分为外部招聘与内部招聘,由于外部招聘存在着信息不对称,招聘的过程亦是双方博弈的过程。基于此,本文应用演化博弈理论,构建了企业外部招聘行为的演化博弈模型,通过局部稳定分析及绘制系统相图,揭示了企业外部招聘行为的演化进程,并探讨了系统演化方向的控制因素及可能的控制方法。 When the enterprises needs are far greater than the current supply of human resources for staff having a certain technology,knowledge and capacity,then it needs to recruit new staff,enterprises must take the necessary staff to ensure the continued operation of the organization.Recruitment could be divided into the external recruitment and internal recruitment according to different sources of candidates.There is information asymmetric in external recruitment,the recruitment process is also a game process between the two sides.In this paper,the enterprises external recruitment evolutionary game model is constructed by the theory of evolutionary game,through local stability analysis and mapping system phase diagram,the evolution process of the enterprises external recruitment is revealed, and also the controlling factors of system evolution direction and the possible control methods are discussed.
出处 《中国管理科学》 CSSCI 2008年第S1期613-617,共5页 Chinese Journal of Management Science
关键词 招聘 演化博弈 稳定分析 recruitment evolutionary game stability analysis
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