企业产权、控制权转移与冗员负担——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

Firm Property Rights,Transfering of Control Rights and Labor Redundancy:Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

政府与企业之间的干预与被干预关系历来是我国经济的主要特征之一,本文从控制权转移后企业的冗员负担变化角度对这一问题进行了实证研究。研究发现,国有企业转移给国有企业后,企业的冗员负担显著上升,上升幅度显著大于其他类型的控制权转移;民营企业转移给国有企业后,企业的冗员负担在控制权转移后的第二年也有一定程度的上升;而无论是国有企业转移给民营企业,还是民营企业转移给民营企业,企业的冗员负担都显著下降。进一步的研究结果发现,企业的控制权转移给国有企业后,业绩显著差异转移给民营企业的企业。上述结果表明,地方政府在通过并购获得企业的控制权后,让它们承担了更多的冗员负担,这是造成这些企业的业绩较差的主要原因。论文从一个新的角度检验了政府干预的表现及其经济后果问题,对政府干预、政策负担、控制权等领域的文献进行了拓展。

The intervened and be intervened relationship between government and enterprises has always been one of the main features of China' s economy.This paper investigates this problem from the perspective of the changes in redundancy burden after the control rights transfer.It is found that the enterprises' redundancy burden increase significantly when the control rights transferred from state - owned enterprises to state - owned enterprises,and the rise was significantly larger than other types of control rights transfer.The enterprises' redundancy burden also increased to some extent in the second year when they were transferred from non - state - owned enterprises to state - owned enterprises.But the enterprises ' redundancy burden was significandy decreased wherever the control rights transferred from the state - owned enterprises to the non - state - owned enterprises or the non - state - enterprises to non - state - enterprises.Further research found that the performance of those enterprises whose control rights transferred to state - owned enterprises significantly worse than that whose control rights transferred to non - state - owned enterprises.These results indicate that the enterprises take on more redundancy burden after their control rights transferred to state - owned enterprises through M&A by the local government.And this is the cause lead to these enterprises' poor performance.