基于委托代理理论的武器装备研制激励合同分析

Weapon Research Incentive Contract Analysis Based on Principal-agent Theory

基于委托代理理论,研究武器装备研制激励合同设置问题,拓展了传统的委托代理模型,认为激励合同的设计应该考虑行为双方对自然状态项不同认识的情况。以参数化例子阐述军方根据承研承制单位武器装备研制活动而设定激励合同的内容。研究结果表明:武器装备研制活动中,军方与承研承制单位具有委托代理关系;承研承制单位的最优努力水平是成本系数和奖惩因子的比值;军方设定的奖惩因子是成本系数、风险规避量以及自然状态项方差的递减函数;合理的激励合同实施可以使军方和承研承制单位明晰各自的成本、收益以及风险。

Incentive contract between the military and weapon research department is analyzed based on principal-agent theory.Traditional principal-agent model is extended.Different cognitions about the state of the world of the military and weapon research department are considered.A parametric example to explain the contents of incentive contract is made.This research shows that:the military and weapon research department have principal-agent relationship in weapon research processes;weapon research department' s optimal effort level is the ratio of cost coefficient and rewards and punishment factor;the rewards and punishment factor set by the military is decreasing function of cost coefficient,risk aversion and variance of the state of the world;the implementing of incentive contract may make the military and weapon research department clear about their cost,profit and risk.