不对称信息条件下激励机制的模型设计与扩展

Design and Expansion of Incentive Mechanism Model under Asymmetric Information Condition

运用数学分析和博弈论的方法,设计激励机制的数学模型,并引入对监控机制的分析,从而扩展了激励机制的理论框架。分析结果表明:监控机制与激励机制具有相关性,二者之间具有一定的相互替代作用,都能激励或引导代理人努力工作。因此,在制定报酬契约过程中,应该综合考虑激励机制与监控机制的作用。监控机制的引入,不仅在理论上具有一定的创新性,而且在实践中具有较大的应用价值。

Mathematic models of incentive mechanism are designed with mathematic analytic methods and game theory. Supervision mechanism is considered and analyzed in the design of incentive mechanism.This expands the theory frame of the incentive mechanism.The results are as following.Supervision mechanism is related with incentive mechanism. They can replace each other.They can encourage or guide the agent to work hard.Therefore,the function of the incentive mechanism and the supervision mechanism should be considered synthetically in the design of the incentive contract. The analyses of supervision mechanism in the incentive mechanism not only have theoretical innovation,but also have bigger application value in practice.