供应链企业间机会主义行为及关系契约治理研究——基于抵押物模型的实证分析被引量：6

A Study of Opportunism & It's Governance Based on Relational Contracts

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摘要机会主义行为治理是经济学、法学、社会学、管理学等各领域学者的热门话题,近年不通过法院、仲裁等第三方强制执行的自执行"关系契约"越来越为实践所见,本研究试图通过对机会主义和关系契约相关文献的理论梳理,结合多次企业家深度访谈结果,构建了通过关系契约治理供应链企业间机会主义行为的分析模型,即抵押物模型。研究采用问卷调查方式,探讨未来收益、声誉市场、资产专用性投资等抵押物对机会主义行为的影响,并根据前人理论和访谈结果引入关系契约信任、交往型私人交情和情感型私人交情等关系认知因素开展实证分析,最后验证了关系契约治理机会主义行为存在着抵押物机制和信任、交往型私人交情的调节作用这一机制。 Recently,much attention has been given to the phenomenon of opportunism and the appropriate governance of opportunisms in the research field of economics,law,sociology and management. This study tries to explore the influence of hostage variables: continuity,reputation,specific assets against to inter-firm opportunism. According to the literature review,the research put forward a moderational framework of trust and closeness based on hostage model. The empirical results support the most hypotheses,including the negative influence between the hostage variables and opportunism,as well as the trust and interpersonal closeness moderation.

作者周海军杨忠

机构地区南京大学商学院

出处《南京社会科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第1期43-51,共9页 Nanjing Journal of Social Sciences

关键词机会主义行为关系契约抵押物私人交情 opportunism relational contract hostage closeness

分类号 F274 [经济管理—企业管理] F224 [经济管理—国民经济]

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参考文献25

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二级参考文献15

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