现金股利政策抑制公司过度投资行为分析

Research in Policy and Transitional Investment of Controlling Shareholders and Cash Dividends

文本基于我国上市公司大小股东间严重代理冲突、控股股东政府性质以及各地区市场化进程差异的背景,从过度投资的视角对现金股利政策的治理效应进行了理论分析,并以2006-2010年沪深A股上市公司为样本,实证检验控股股东控制、市场化进程对现金股利政策抑制公司过度投资之治理效果的影响。结果表明:现金股利政策能够抑制公司的过度投资行为,而上市公司控股股东的政府性质以及两权分离度的提高会削弱这种抑制作用;推进市场化进程有助于强化现金股利政策的积极治理效应;进一步研究还发现现金股利政策因能抑制过度投资,故有助于提升公司绩效。文本研究不仅是对现金股利政策与公司绩效关系研究的有益补充,同时对于理解我国上市公司现金股利政策的有效性及其完善等,亦具有重要参考价值。

The essay, based on serious proxy clash between big and small shareholders of listed firms in China and nature of gov- ernment in holding stockholders and gap in market progress in different parts, makes a theoretic analysis of control over cash-divi- dend policy in the perspective of excessive investment and take listed firms holding share A in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Ex- changes as a sample to check the effect of holding stockholders' control, market progress upon cash-dividend policy to check firms from excessive investment. The findings show that cash-dividend policy can check excessive investment made by firms while the holding stockholders' government nature of listed firms and raised separation in dual powers will weaken such a checking role. Boost- ing market progress helps intensify the positive control effect of cash-dividend policy and further study also reveals that cash-divi- dend policy helps promote the performance of firms as it checks excessive investment. The essay not only complements the study in the relation between cash-dividend policy and firm performance but bears significant value of reference for the efficiency and im- provement of cash-dividend policy in our listed firms.