摘要
哈柏马斯把过去西方传统哲学对“主体性”的强调转化为对“互主体性”的强调,并以此维护人的主体性和理性的普遍性。哈柏马斯的交谈伦理学就是要把哲学的重心由重视认识自然、征服自然的旧传统转到对人与人之间的相互交往和相互理解。康德的道德律是独自式地建立起来的,哈柏马斯则认为道德律应通过主体间的对话方式来建立。儒家的道德律是“天理”,是“天”或圣人之“心”的独自的产物,而归根结蒂是封建统治者“天子”的独白的产物,“天理”不容许有任何交谈、商讨的余地。“谏君”和“纳谏”只是君与臣之间的不平等的对话,对话的最后裁决者不是理性,而是君主、天子。孔子所讲的“仁”不是主体性,更非互主体性。墨子的“兼相爱”则颇有主体性和互主体性的思想闪光。在有着儒家传统的中国,哲学思想和伦理思想究应走什么方向?是对话还是独白?这还是个问题。
Harbermas has shifted the focus of the Western Classical Philosophy from subjectivity to intersuhjectivity, in an effort to maintain the subjectivity of man and the universality of reason. The purpose of Harhermas's discussion ethics is to establish a philosophical approach to social intercourse and the mutual understandings of men, in stead of the traditional emphasis on knowing and conquering nature. Kant's ethical principles were set up by means of monologue, whereas Harbermas upholds that ethical principles should take the form of dialogue. The ethical principles of the Confucian school is based on the 'Way of Heaven,' which is a product of monologue by Heaven or saints. Growing out of the monologue of a feudal sovereign, the 'Way of Heaven' does not have room for dialogue or discussion. The 'remonstrance' to the king and the latter's acceptance are an unequal dialogue between a sovereign and his subjects. The final judge of this dialogue is not reason but the sovereign. Confucius's 'benevolence' is neither subjectivity nor intersubjectivity. The Moist concept of 'universal love,' on the other hand, contains the sparks of both. It still remains a question whether the new orientation of Chinese philosophy and ethics should take the form of dialogue or that of monologue.
出处
《北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
1993年第1期28-32,129,共6页
Journal of Peking University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)