论我国国有企业资产管理体制的深化改革

Deepening Reform in the Management System of State-Owned Assets

一、当前国有企业资产管理中存在的问题1.管理混乱,“家底”不清。建国后,为了不断充实社会主义建设的物质基础,我国财政通过各种途径进行了大量的投资。但由于长期没有建立专门的国有资产管理机构,形成了计委、经委、财政、物资、银行、主管部门多头管理的局面,国有企业资产处于谁都管、谁都不管的状况。清产核资周期长、次数少(建国至今仅搞过四次),加之制度不严、管理混乱松弛,每次清产核资后暴露的问题都未能解决,致使财政投入年年增加,帐外资金日趋膨胀,国有企业资产“家底”不清,没有形成有效的管理机制。

Having analysed the disadvantage of the traditional management system of stateowned assets, the author points out that the lack of orientation and complementary measures in the reform of the earlier stage is the root cause of such problems as low efficiency in state-owned enterprises, combination of government administration and enterprise operation, confusion of investment and management functions, and slow development of capital market, etc. Suggesting an amendment to the current 'separation of two rights' theory, the author holds that there should be several levels in the process of the separation of two rights, i.e. there should be an intermediary organ between the stateownership and medium and small-sized enterprises. The intermediary organ may take the form of specialized investment companies, share-holding companies and conglomerates.Consequently,there should be secondary separation of operational rights among state, intermediary organs and medium or small-sized enterprises respectively. The intermediary organs act as enterprises, without governmental functions. The aim of in-depth reform is the establishment of a triple management system involving Administrative Bureau for State-Owned Assets at the macro-evel, intermediary organs at the middle Level and medium or small—sized enterprise at the micro-level. The author believes that medium or small-sizsd enterprises which run at a deficit and which only have indirect relations with the national economy and the people's livelihood should be restructured by means of share-holding systems or privatization-orientated methods.