生产经营责任制与劳动积极性——集体农业理论与中国农业制度改革

Responsibility System and Farmer's Initiative

本文以中国农业现行的生产经营责任制为对象,通过对各种集体农业理论的比较研究,阐明了集体农业制度下劳动监督的可能性和劳动积极性的重要.作者建立了各种形式生产经营责任制的收入分配数学模型,指出劳动积极性在集体经营制、班组承包制、个体承包制、家庭承包经营责任制系列中逐次增大.利用数年边际土地生产率数据,测算了实行各种形式生产经营责任制提高土地生产率的效果.文章最后指出,在社会主义体制下,解决农业劳动监督的唯一出路,是推行家庭承包经营责任制这种使农民劳动极限报酬与极限产品相一致的制度.

Focusing their attention on the production-management responsibility system in China's rural economy, the co-authors of this article make comparisons among different theories on collective farming before reviewing the possibility of exercising labor control in collective farming and the importance of encouraging the farmer's initiative. They proceed to formulate mathematic models of the distribution of earnings under the different responsibility systems, ranging from collective management, team contract, individual contract to family contract, and they point out that the rise of the farmer' s initiative follows such an order. On the basis of the data of the land productivity in several years, they make an appraisal of the increase of such productivity under different patterns of responsibility system. The coauthors conclude their exposition by affirming that in socialism the only way to exercise labor control in farming is the family contract arrangement, an arrangement marked by the identity of the farmer's maximum product with the maximum labor he puts in.