摘要
军备控制谈判是实现军事战略的辅助手段,双方都想通过谈判加强自己,削弱对方。随着核战略的变化,美苏两国现在的核谈判政策与前有所不同。美苏均有困难,需要妥协。苏联困难相对更大,对美让步较多,同时它注意运用策略,较为灵活,设法逐项突破,美国则态度较为僵硬。如果继中导协议之后,双方在战略核武器方面又达成协议,美苏缓和势将扩大。这次新缓和的时间可能比70年代为长。虽然如此,军控谈判的作用有限,它将改善两国关系,但不能消除双方军备竞赛由数量向质量的新发展,以及它们在各地区的争夺。对抗仍是两国关系的实质。美苏今后将在激烈的竞争中共处。
Since the arms control talks serve as an auxiliary means
in the implementation of their respective military strategics, each side intends
to strengthen itself and weaken the other side through the talks. Along with
the changes in their nuclear strategics, the present policies of both the United
States and the Soviet Union towards the nuclear talks differ from their former
policies. Both of them have difficulties and need compromise. As the difficulties
the Soviet Union is confronted with are greater, it has made greater concessions
towards the United States. Besides, the Soviet Union is better at tactical
manoeuvring, shows greater flexibility and tries to effect a breakthrough point
by point, while the United States sticks to its relatively more rigid stance.
If an agreement is reached by the two sides on the strategic nuclear weapons
after the INF Treaty, the U. S. -Soviet detent will inevitably expand. This
new detente will possibly last for a longer period of time than the detente of
the 1970's. Nevertheless, the arms control talks will only play a limited role.
The talks will improve the relations between the two countries to a certain ex-
tent, but will not be able to prevent the new development of the arms race,
which is shifting from a race in quantity to a race in quality, or to put an end
to their rivalry is various regions.
出处
《国际问题研究》
1988年第2期1-7,16+63,共9页
International Studies