摘要
银行体系中不良资产过大与国有企业的高负债率相配合,构成我国近年来银企之间债务关系扭曲的基本格局。关于银企之间债务关系扭曲原因的形成及其整治,金融界和学术界多从规范银行行为和企业行为方面展开讨论,这固然重要,但根本的还是政府行为的规范问题,即银企债务关系扭曲的背后,是中央和地方各级政府行为的严重扭曲,最终结果是形成了大量没有供给保证的超规模贷款,或者叫做“空心投资”
A large quantity of unhealthy assets of banks and high rate of liabilities of state own enter prises form the twisted basic pattern of liabilities between banks and enterprises of China. Of the shaping of liabilities between banks and enterprises and its adminitstration, banking and academic circles argue that bank and enterprise behavior should be standardized. Important as this is, to standardize government behavior is what really counts, i.e. behind the twisted relation between banks and enterprises lies the unhealthy behavior of central government and local governments. Finally, a large scale of loans which can not be fully supplied or 'hollow investment' come into being.
出处
《兰州大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
1997年第3期92-98,共7页
Journal of Lanzhou University(Social Sciences)
关键词
债务关系
政府行为
空心投资
liabilities government behavior hollow investment