康德理论哲学范围内物自身概念分析

The Concept of "Thing in Itself" in Kant's Theoretical Philosophy

物自身学说是康德批判哲学中最为重要、最为难解因而最易引起争论的问题之一,而且它又直接关系到哲学、尤其是认识论的基本难题,而这个难题直到今天也很难说已经得到很好的解决.因此,研究康德的物自身概念就具有双重的困难,即一方面是它本来意义的难解,另一方面是从哲学的根本问题着眼分析它的意义的不易.但是,这同时提示了研究这个问题具有与此对应的双重意义.本文的目的首先在于分析康德理论哲学范围内物自身的一般意义,提出新的分类观点,然后进一步讨论对象两重性的问题,以求得对于康德本意的正确领会. 物自身是与现象同时被规定了的.用以决定我们认识的现象性质的条件在另一方面也就决定了物自身及其不可知的特性.由于物自身包含有多层的意思,因而与之相关的概念。

The discussion of the 'thing in itself' in this article focuses on two problems:(1) classification and definition of the different senses of 'thing in itself', and (2)justification of the view concerning the duality of objects. The unknowable is the es-sence of 'thing in itself', which can be divided into two types. The first type is cor-related to such empirical objects as sensible intuition, transcendental object, noumena,and the transcendental 'I'. The other type consists of World and God, which denotethe totality of experience and are unrelated to empirical objects. Appearance and 'thingin itself' differ only in perspective. In the first case, the subjective forms are con-sidered, whereas in the second, all subjective forms and relations are excluded fromconsideration.