评蒯因对逻辑经验论的批判

On Quine's Critique of Logical Empiricism

蒯因(Willard Van Orman Quine) 是分析哲学发展史上一个非常重要的哲学家.他于五十年代初发表的《经验论的两个教条》一文(以后引述此文时简写为《两个教条》) 被认为是分析哲学发展史上具有里程碑意义的篇章.人们一般都认为正是它动摇了逻辑经验论的理论基石并因而导致了逻辑经验论的衰落.就蒯因本人哲学思想发展线索而言,此文的意义也非同小可.它可以说是他整个哲学思想的缩影,他后来的大部分思想在此文中都已见其端倪.正是在此文的基础上他提出了自己的自然化认识论用以代替他自以为已被他摧毁了的传统认识论(主要指逻辑经验论).

This is a critical review of Quine's critique of logical empiricism. The authorholds that Quine's critique has not really shaken the foundation of logical empiricism,i. e., the strict distinction between analytical and synthetical statements, or betweenmetaphysical and non-metaphysical statements. Quine only casts doubt on the demarca-tion criteria offered by the logical empiricists: the definitions of analyticity and theverification theory of meaning. In the last analysis, the extreme holism of knowledgeemployed by Quine is itself not convincing.