金融支持、不良贷款与内生金融产权

Financial Support, Non-performing Loans and Endogenous Financial Property Right

中国的金融体系在经济转轨过程中起到了重要作用,但同时也付出了一定的代价,一来银行体系中的巨额不良贷款积累了大量风险,二来滞后的金融市场化改革逐渐成为经济转轨的最大障碍之一。本文通过建立一个政府与银行间的两阶段动态博弈模型,分析蕴涵在其中的真正机理:由于存在政策性贷款和商业性贷款的分离,带来了信息不对称和预算软约束问题,从而使银行无动力改善经营,政府为解决信息问题带来的负面影响又不得不进一步提高对银行的产权份额。解决这些问题的根本途径是从真正意义上消除政策性贷款和商业性贷款的差别,惟此才能硬化预算约束,才能矫正内生金融产权对银行激励机制的扭曲。

China's financial system has played an important role in the process of economic transition in China, but also paid certain price at the same time: first, the substantial non-performing loans have accumulated great financial risk; second, the stagnant market-oriented financial reform has become one of the greatest handicaps for economic transition. Through building a two-stage dynamic game model between government and banks, it analyzes the real mechanism behind these phenomena. It shows that the separation between policy loans and commerce loans has caused information asymmetric and soft budget constraint problems, which discourages bank's performance. In order to offset the negative effect, the government has to raise the property share in banks. The ultimate approach to resolving these problems is to remove the separation between policy loans and commerce loans, which is the only way to harden budget constraint and rectify the distorted incentive mechanism of banks.