摘要
我国上市公司一个明显的特征就是偏好股权融资的同时运行效率却很低,被称之为效率悖论。文章从股权制度安排、股票融资与投资行为之间关系出发,建立模型进行解读:上述悖论源于我国特殊的股权分割制度导致国有资产折股存在溢价效应,激励国有企业承担净现值为负的投资项目。因此尽快减持国有股将是改变目前国有企业困境的重要途径之一。
There is an efficiency paradox among China's listed companies characterized by the preference of equity financing and low efficiency of operation. This paper explains this paradox by developing a model from the aspect of relationship between equity structure design, equity financing and investment behavior. It holds that the above paradox originated from the special separation of equity from property in China leads to overpriced state-owned assets, which stimulates listed corporations to invest some projects with negative NPV. Therefore, decreasing state-owned equity is one of the important paths to solve the present paradox of state-owned enterprises.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第8期115-121,共7页
Journal of Finance and Economics
关键词
效率悖论
股权制度
股票融资
过度投资
净现值
efficiency paradox
equity structure design
equity financing
over-investment
NPV.