道德的客观性何以可能？──评普特南的道德客观性思想及其与逻辑实证主义的分歧

How Is Moral Objectivity Possible?

伦理学的客观性，历来是一个令人困惑的难题。普特南（Ｈ，Ｐｕｔｎａｍ）站在新实用主义立场上，批判了逻辑实证主义割裂事实与价值从而否定伦理学客观性的观点；继而以“内在实在论”为舞台，展示了事实与价值的相互渗透，论证了伦理学与其他科学没有本质的区别，道德的客观性只能是对人而言的客观性。本文论述了普特南的这一思想并分析了它的得失。

hether ethics can be objective has always been a puzzling question. From a neo-pragmatistic standpoint, H. Putnam criticizes Logical positivism which holds fact/valuedistinction and negates the objectivity of ethics. He reveals the mutual penetration of facts and values and asserts that there is no essential difference between ethics and other sciences, and that moral objectivity is possible only in the sense that it is not beyond us human beings. The paperanalyzes H. Putnam's point of view and its gain and loss.