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非合作Internet用户行为特征和约束机制的研究

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摘要 基于一次博弈模型的流速与拥塞控制方法虽然能解释用户的非合作行为,但是由于最终的均衡解的效率不高,影响了其应用价值.文中在讨论了一次博弈模型和流速均衡的解析解的基础上,对基于无限重复博弈模型的流速与拥塞控制行为进行了深入研究.提出了重复和无限重复流速与拥塞控制博弈模型,论证了重复博弈NEP的存在性和最优性,并讨论了重复博弈中贴现因子的意义.接着研究了N个用户的无限重复流速控制博弈中用户不合理行为的惩罚威胁策略,设计了无限和有限博弈中用户行为的惩罚约束方法.最后利用重复博弈模型中的结论,提出了一种基于重复博弈模型的流速率控制算法FCAR.仿真实验表明,FCAR算法能够较为有效地规范和约束用户不合理行为,促使理性的非合作用户达成合作,以实现整个流速与拥塞控制系统效用的最优.
出处 《中国科学:信息科学》 CSCD 2010年第12期1575-1585,共11页 Scientia Sinica(Informationis)
基金 国家自然科学基金(批准号:60603067 70872046 70671054) 国家高技术研究发展计划(批准号:2007AA01Z422) 国家重点基础研究发展计划(批准号:2009CB320501)资助项目
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参考文献20

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