医疗服务中道德风险的博弈分析

Game Analysis on Moral Hazard in Medical Services

在中国目前的医疗体制下,医疗服务市场中医患双方是博弈的主体。由于医疗服务的特殊性,造成医院和患者这两个主体之间的信息不对称,患者在医患双方博弈中明显处于弱势地位。在引入第三方(各种保险)后,可看成患者与医院(医生)和各种保险机构之间的双重博弈,而在这种博弈中,患者总是处于信息弱势地位,利益可能受到双重侵害。实际上,引入第三方购买有效控制的只是增加了医患信息不对称导致的医疗服务提供方的道德风险,而对医患信息不对称导致医疗服务需求方的道德风险作用不大,并有可能扩大这种道德风险。

Under the present medical system,hospital and patients are the main body of the game in the medical service market.Owing to the peculiarity of medical service,the information between the subjects of hospital and patient are unsymmetrical and the patients are in an unfavorable position in this game.After the third parties(the variety of insurance) were introduced,this game could be viewed as the double game between the hospital and medical insurance organization.In these two games,the patients are always in an unfavorable position of gaining information and could be subject to double injury.Actually the introduction of the Third Side Purchase can only increase the asymmetry information between hospital and patient,and the moral risk from the supplier of this medical service,but have little effect on the moral risk from the demander side of this service and may be deepen this moral risk.