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实验博弈研究发展综述

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摘要 实验博弈可以为博弈理论研究提供进一步拓展的空间。在博弈论理论发展的同时,实验博弈中的典型论题:最后通牒、讨价还价、拍卖、古诺寡头实验都取得了显著的进展。在此基础上,本文总结了近年来实验博弈的研究热点和前沿,并对实验博弈的进一步发展提供了思路。
作者 王兆冬 周华
出处 《消费导刊》 2009年第23期208-209,共2页
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参考文献17

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