摘要
本文对大股东持股与高管人员变更关系研究的系列文献从投资者保护的角度进行了综述。公司治理的目的在于保护中小投资者,在投资者法律保护较差的国家里,集中所有权结构被看成是能够替代投资者法律保护,有效发挥公司治理作用的机制。自20世纪80年代始,公司治理机制对高管变更影响的研究散见于各文献,而亚洲金融危机的爆发引起了对亚洲地区现行投资者保护下大股东治理与高层更换之间关系的广泛研究。在资本市场已经发展了十几年的中国,中国的学者们开始反思现行的制度安排是否能够有效地保护中小投资者的利益,并结合证券市场的现状做了一系列的研究。
This paper makes a summary on the relationship between the controlling shareholder and top management turnover. Corporate governance emphasizes on investor protection, and the large shareholders play an important role in corporate governance mechanisms. High ownership concentration is generally regarded as an alternative protection to the poor investor in corporate governance. Since 1980s', some researches on corporate governance and management change had brought a new angle of view on the problem of investor protection. After the Asian financial crisis, people paid more attention on the state holding of controlling shareholder and investor protection in companies of East Asia.Scholars in China have tried to find some ways to protect investors and help them set up confidence.
出处
《北京城市学院学报》
2009年第6期56-60,共5页
Journal of Beijing City University
关键词
大股东
高管人员变更
投资者保护
公司治理
controlling shareholder
top management turnover
investor protection
corporate governance