摘要
Both conflict and asymmetric information exist betweenthe telecom operators and the service provider,and result in illegal behaviors of the service provider.The relationship between the telecom operators andthe service provider is classical multi-task principalagentrelationship. The multi-task incentive for theservice provider is considered in the design of theprincipal-agent incentive contract, and it is necessaryto add the multi-task incentive to the serviceproviders through the analysis of the risk costs andthe agency costs of this problem.
Both conflict and asymmetric information exist between the telecom operators and the service provider, and result in illegal behaviors of the service provider. The relationship between the telecom operators and the service provider is classical multi-task principal-agent relationship. The multi-task incentive for the service provider is considered in the design of the principal-agent incentive contract, and it is necessary to add the. multi-task incentive to the service providers through the analysis of the risk costs and the agency costs of this problem.
