基于管理防御的企业投资短视行为的实验研究

Experimental Study on Corporate Investment Myopia Behavior Under Managerial Entrenchment

国外研究成果已从理论上证明经理管理防御动机是导致企业投资短视行为的主要原因之一。但在企业中经理人员决策投资项目的真实动机是不可直接观察的,加之企业投资决策过程和资料的保密性,很难通过实证分析方法对管理防御与投资短视行为之间的关系进行研究。本文采取实验研究方法,通过制定标准实验流程与实验说明书,对210名实验参与者的实验数据进行统计分析,发现在我国不同类型企业中普遍存在着经理管理防御行为的动机,这种动机导致了企业的投资短视行为;而且随着经理能力下降和预期转换工作成本的提高,其管理防御程度呈上升趋势,投资短视行为更加显著。

Foreign research results have proved theoretically that manager managerial entrenchment is one of the main reasons of corporate investment myopia behavior.But in corporate the true motive that the manager making investment decision can not be directly observed,and as the secrecy of investment decision-making process and data in corporate, it is difficult to use the empirical analysis method to study the relationship between managerial entrenchment and investment myopia.The paper used experimental study method,formulated standard experimental flow and experimental instructions,and found that there is widespread manager managerial entrenchment behavioral motive in different types of enterprises in China and this motive will lead corporate investment myopia behavior;moreover with the decrease of ability and the increase of expected relocation cost,manager's managerial entrenchment degree is on the rise and the investment myopia behavior is even more remarkable based on the statistical analysis of the 210 experimental participants' experimental data.