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管理层持股结构性因素的实证研究 被引量:1

An Empirical Analysis on Structural Factors of Managerial Ownership
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摘要 首先根据该领域的经典理论建立若干管理层持股比例与公司绩效关系的竞争性假设;进而以组织行为学的公平理论为基础,建立若干管理层持股结构与公司绩效关系的假设。以沪深两市的242家上市公司为样本,在解决自变量界定、因变量匹配、控制变量选择和时滞因素等问题的基础上,通过统计分析发现:管理层持股比例总体上对企业绩效存在正向影响,但是这种影响比较微弱,而且在管理层持股比例低于万分之一情况下这种影响并不显著;更为重要的是,研究发现了管理层持股离散度这一结构变量对企业绩效具有显著的负向影响,这种影响甚至超过了管理层持股比例的正向影响。研究结论表明在管理层持股与绩效关系研究中结构性因素的重要价值。 Western scholars give out different propositions on the relationship between managerial ownership proportion and performance, and empirical results are also mixed, so competitive hypotheses are set first. Then three hypotheses on the relationship between managerial ownership structure and performance are also set on the basis of equity theory. After solving four predetermined problems, statistical analysis are employed to get the conclusion. The final sample consists of 242 Chinese public companies. The result indicates that managerial ownership proportion do have a positive effect on financial performance thougi not very strong. What’s more, the deviation of managerial ownership proportion has an obvious negative effect on financial performance, which even exceeds the previous positive effect.Paying more attention on structural factors on managerial ownership research in future becomes important.
作者 盛南 袁燕清
出处 《管理案例研究与评论》 2008年第3期89-98,共10页 Journal of Management Case Studies
基金 教育部高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金(20060335127)资助
关键词 管理层持股结构 管理层持股比例 上市公司 managerial ownership structure managerial ownership proportion public company
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