重大事件与封闭式基金的信息披露

Momentous Event and Information Disclosure of Closed-End Fund

2001年8月银广夏事件爆发。当时各证券投资基金中,持有银广夏股票比例最高者是基金景宏,其次为同属大成基金管理公司旗下的基金景福。受限于当时的估值办法,银广夏作为景宏、景福所持有的问题性资产,在停牌期间的估值是被高估了,相应的,景宏、景福在银广夏停牌期间的公告净值是被高估的。各封闭式基金于2001年7月发布的第二季度投资组合公告,在银广夏事件于次月初爆发时,应是有价值的参考信息,投资者本来可据以推测,哪些基金在事发时比较可能重仓持有银广夏。但迹象显示,基金投资者并未主动注意到这个历史信息。此个案结果暗示,投资者的注意力放在当前的显性信息上,过往的公开信息,如果在当时并未引起注意,在后来即使成为有价值的信息,除非经媒体提醒,不易再引起投资者的注意。媒体上的二手信息传播会影响相关基金的二级市场定价,只要该信息在首次披露时,市场并未给予关注。

As the Yinguangxia Event broke out on August 2nd 2001, the CSRC suspended the trading of Yinguangxia stock until September. As a result, the net asset values (NAV) of the affected closed-end funds were overstated. This overstatement might distort the secondary market pricing of a closed-end fund. Our findings indicate that closed-end fund investors seem not to have capability to capture the NAV overstatement by themselves. They failed to imbibe the information of momentous event until it was clearly pointed out by the public media. In order to protect market investors, we propose that the affected closed-end funds should be required to disclose the effect of momentous event on NAV as soon as possible.