摘要
本文认为马里奥·本格由于脱离实践考察实在、概念等本体论问题而造成了一系列理论上的失误。首先,他的实在观是错误的,他所定义的实在还不能等同于作为客观实在的物质;其次,虽然本格的概念理论有不少合理之处,但他把类和概念相混同得出概念客体是一种虚构的错误结论;最后,笔者认为应当在社会实践的基础上确立概念客体的本体论特征。
This article points out Mario Benger made theoretically a series of mistakes because he separated himself from practice while investigating such problems as reality and concept concening ontology. Firstly, the so-called realism of his is mistaken, and the reality he defined can't yet considered identical to objectively true substance. Secondly despite the fact that there's something in his conceptional theory, the conceptional object he concluded proves imaginary and wrong as he confused category with conception. The writer holds features of ontology for conceptional object can be determined merely on the basis of social practice.
出处
《武汉工程职业技术学院学报》
1998年第1期43-48,59,共7页
Journal of Wuhan Engineering Institute
关键词
实在
虚构
类
概念
reality, imaginary, category, concept.