摘要
基于关系契约视角,通过对建设项目参与者动态博弈过程的分析,建立了委托代理模型,并设计一套最优报酬激励机制。研究表明:未来收益折现率越小,关系契约的激励效果越显著;业主获得的产出越高,双方未来合作的可能性越大;承包制是各参与者满足约束条件的唯一纳什均衡。
Based on the perspective of relational contract,the paper establishes a model of principal-agent and then designs a set of optimal payment incentives by a dynamic game model which analyzes the participants in the construction projects.The conclusions indicate that the incentive effect of relational contracts is more significant with the reduction of discount rate;the possibility of cooperating in the future is greater with obtaining higher output;contracting system is only Nash equilibrium to satisfy the constraints of each participant.
出处
《沈阳建筑大学学报（社会科学版）》
2013年第3期264-267,共4页
Journal of Shenyang Jianzhu University:Social Science
基金
教育部人文社会科学基金项目(08JA790085)
辽宁省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目(W2010354)
关键词
建设项目
正式契约
关系契约
激励
动态博弈
construction projects
formal contract
relational contract
incentive
dynamic games
