企业生产行为和官员监管行为的演化博弈模型及仿真分析

The Analysis of Evolution Game Model and Simulation Between the Productive Behavior of the Firms and the Supervision of the Officials

基于企业生产行为和官员监管行为共同决定市场上食品的质量安全水平这一观点,借助演化博弈方法,构建了企业与官员策略互动的支付矩阵。通过对互动过程的演化模型分析,揭示了个体策略选择对群体行为的影响,同时用数值仿真演示了不同参数变化对演化趋势和结果的影响。研究结果发现,"官员努力监管得到的激励"和"企业生产伪劣食品被发现时受到的惩罚"这两个参数的大小会影响系统收敛结果,(努力监管,生产合格食品)、(监管失职,生产伪劣食品)、(监管失职,生产合格食品)都有可能成为系统的演化稳定策略。因此,进行有效的食品质量安全治理,必须同时针对企业和官员设计科学合理的激励与约束机制,来引导企业和官员的行为向着预期的方向和目标演进。

Based on the viewpoint that the productive behavior of the enterprise and the supervision of the government will lead to the level of food safety of the market jointly,in this paper the payoff matrix is constructed where the behavior of the enterprise and the regulator interact with each other by means of evolutionary game theory.Through evolution model analysis of the interaction process,it can be found that the strategic choice of the individual has an influence on the group behavior.And the variation of the different parameters have an influence on the trend and the result of the evolution by the means of numerical simulation.The research results show that ' the reward that the regulator may get by making efforts to supervise' and 'the punishment that the enterprise may get by producing the unqualified food' the variation of this two parameters have influence on the speed and result of the convergence of the system,(make effort to supervise,produce the qualified food).,(do not make effort to supervise,produce the unqualified food),(do not make effort to supervise,produce the qualified food) may become the evolutionary stable strategy of the system.To solve the food safety problem of the market,the reasonable excitation parameter and the constraint parameter must be needed to be designed jointly for the government and the enterprise in order to guide the behavior of the enterprise and the government towards the expected direction and goal.