碳关税对中美两国影响的博弈分析

A Game Analysis on the Effects of Carbon Tariff on China and the United States

基于中美两国产品生产成本和单位产品碳排放量均不同的事实,以美国仅实施碳税政策的两阶段博弈模型为基准,引入美国政府对从中国进口产品开征碳关税是由于中国政府未实施环境规制政策的事由,构建了美国继续实施碳关税政策的三阶段博弈模型。运用逆向求解法得出各模型的均衡解,比较了美国继续开征碳关税的效应,发现美国开征碳关税将使美国企业被征收更高的碳税税率,两国企业产量、利润和碳排放量都下降,中国产品国际竞争力提高,但国家福利可能恶化,相反,美国产品国际竞争力下降,国家福利却总是得到改善。

Based on the fact that production cost and unit carbon emission by unit product are different in China and the U.S.,a two-stage game model where the U.S.only impose carbon tax is constructed as a benchmark.Then an argument by the United States that China doesn' t carry out any environmental policy leads the U.S.to impose a carbon tariff on the imports from China is introduced,and the two-stage game model can be changed to a threestage model.By backward induction,the perfect equilibrium of each stage is obtained to compare the effects of imposing a carbon tariff on China and the United States.It' s found that imposing a carbon tariff on imports from China will increase the rate of carbon tax,decrease production and profits of both firms,and lead to less carbon emission.It' s also found that China may be worse off though the international competitiveness of its product is enhanced,however,the United States will always be better off though the international competitiveness of its product is decreased.