关系型借贷与社会信用体系的构建——基于小微企业演化博弈的视角

Relationship Lending and the Construction of Social Credit System:From a Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory of MSEs

文章以小微企业的"硬信息"不可获得性和企业主的自然人属性为背景,从小微企业主的道德伦理出发,运用阿马蒂亚·森的确保原则将银行面临的道德风险转化为两类企业不确定性的类型风险,并借助博弈分析模型研究关系型借贷对企业贷款行为模式的影响。研究发现:(1)欺诈企业的存在会导致整个信贷市场的恶化;(2)在引入了银行贷款策略选择和企业声誉机制后,关系型借贷由于在一定程度上解决了信息不对称问题而实现了信贷合约的自我实施,并将促使"欺诈"企业向"诚信"企业演化,从而提高社会整体信用水平。文章的博弈分析结论还得到了浙江省台州市三家"城商行"的经验数据的支持。文章将道德伦理的因素重新引入经济系统的研究中,发现关系型借贷对营造良好的社会信用体系具有重要的价值。

Based on MSE'non-availability of hard information and MSE owners' natural person property,this paper employs the assurance principle proposed by Amartya Sen to transfer moral hazard of firms into two types of risks of firm uncertainty from a perspective of moral ethics of MSE owners,and studies the effect of relationship lending on firm loan behavior modes by game theory.It comes to the conclusions as follows:firstly,the existence of'fraud'firms leads to the deterioration of the whole credit market;secondly,after the introduction of bank lending strategy choices and firm reputation mechanism,relationship lending achieves the self-enforcement of credit contracts owing to its solution to information asymmetry to a certain extent and promotes the transformation of'fraud'firms to'honest'ones,thereby increasing the whole social credit level.The results of game theory analysis also obtain the evidence from three city banks in Taizhou,Zhejiang province.It re-introduces moral ethics into the study of economic system and concludes that relationship lending is of great importance to the construction of sound social credit system.