券商背景独立董事与上市公司内幕交易

Independent Directors from Securities Companies and Informed Trading in Listed Companies

近年来,我国资本市场上出现的一个比较尴尬的现象是,被监管部门和股东寄予改进上市公司治理厚望的部分独立董事,特别是具有券商背景的独立董事,却利用获得上市公司信息的便利,在内幕交易中扮演了不光彩的角色。文章首次检验了特定类型的内部人——券商背景独立董事与公司内幕交易严重程度之间的关系。研究发现:聘任了券商背景独立董事的公司内幕交易的严重程度显著高于其他公司,而且对于会计信息质量较低或者聘请低质量审计师的公司,这一现象更加明显;另外,对于曾经聘任过券商背景独立董事的公司,内幕交易较为严重的现象主要存在于这些独立董事在职年度,而非其他年度。文章的研究结论为证券监管部门重新思考、完善独立董事聘任制度提供了重要的借鉴价值。

In recent years,there is an embarrassed phenomenon in Chinese capital market that some independent directors,especially from securities companies,who are the best hope for listed corporate governance as for regulatory authorities and stakeholders,use the convenience of obtaining the information of listed companies and engage in informed trading.This paper tests the relationship between a special type of insiders,namely independent directors from securities companies,and the severity of informed trading for the first time.It comes to the results as follows:firstly,the severity of informed trading in companies hiring independent directors from securities companies is significantly higher than the one in other companies,especially in companies with lower accounting information quality or low-quality auditors;secondly,as for companies that once hired independent directors from securities companies,severe informed trading occurred during the occupancy of their posts.The conclusions provide important reference for the rethink and perfection of independent director system as for securities regulatory authorities.