我国社会保险费的征管机构选择——基于地税部门行政成本的视角

The Selection of Collection Agencies of Social Insurance Fees in China:From a Perspective of Administrative Costs of Local Taxation Authorities

社会保险费应该由社保部门还是由地税部门征管,是一个争论已久的问题。文章从两个角度进行研究:一是社会保险费的征收机构由社保部门转向地税部门是否会明显增加地税部门的行政成本,在控制了各地经济发展水平、产业结构等因素的影响之后,多元回归模型的测算结果表明,地税部门征收社会保险费后,其行政成本并没有显著增加,甚至还是有效率的;二是比较各地的地税收入和社会保险费的单位征收成本,同样在控制了一些影响因素之后,双重倍差模型的结果表明,由地税部门征收社会保险费的省份单位征收成本与征管收入呈负相关关系,表明由地税跨部门征收社会保险费具有规模效应和协同效应,有利于降低单位税费征收成本。

Whether the collection agencies of social insurance fees should be the social security administration sectors or the local taxation authorities is a problem that has been debated.It conducts the research from two perspectives:firstly,it studies whether the administrative costs of local taxation authorities obviously increases in the process of the transformation of collection agencies of social insurance fees from social security administration sectors to local taxation authorities;after controlling the effects of factors like local economic development levels and industrial structure and according to the calculation of multiple regression models,it shows that after local taxation authorities collect social insurance fees,their administrative costs do not significantly increase and they still have efficiency;secondly,it compares local tax revenues and unit collection cost of social insurance fees and employs difference-in-difference model to study these issues after the control of some influencing factors.The results show that the unit collection cost is negatively correlated with collection revenues in provinces taking local taxation authorities as the collection agencies of social insurance fees,that is to say the collection of social insurance fees by local taxation authorities is featured by scale and synergy effects and is beneficial to the reduction in the unit cost of tax collection.