不对称的声誉机制与独立董事市场需求——来自中国A股ST公司的经验证据

Asymmetrical Reputation Mechanism and Market Demand for Independent Directors:Evidence from A-share ST Companies in China

根据独立董事的功能,独立董事的声誉包括咨询声誉与监督声誉两方面。文章以在ST公司任职来反映独立董事两方面声誉同时受损,利用2002-2012年沪深两市A股公司数据研究发现:ST公司的独立董事未来同一时期所兼任的上市公司数量会减少,而且如果ST公司在其任期内未能成功"摘帽",则其所兼任的上市公司数量会进一步减少;但同时,ST公司的独立董事未来仍可能获得新的上市公司聘请,而且聘请ST公司独立董事的上市公司大股东控制权收益较高。文章研究表明,中国独立董事市场确实排斥声誉受损的董事,但对声誉机制也存在负向需求,即如果公司希望较少受到监督,则它们可能主动追逐监督声誉较差的独立董事。

Based on the function of independent directors,the reputation of independent directors includes consultation reputation and monitoring reputation.This paper regards occupation experience in ST companies as the indicator of simultaneous consultation and monitoring reputation losses of independent directors.Using the data of ST companies listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2002to 2012,it arrives at the results as follows:firstly,independent directors of ST companies suffer a reduction in the number of listed companies which employ cocurrently them during the same period in the future,and if ST companies cannot successfully remove the ST title,this number is smaller;secondly,at the same time,the independent directors of ST companies may still get new invitations from listed companies and the private benefits of control of blockholders in these companies who hire independent directors of ST companies are higher.It shows that independent director market in China actually excludes directors with reputation losses and there is negative demand for reputation mechanism,namely if companies want to obtain little supervision,they may actively hire independent directors with poor monitoring reputation.