SaaS供应商定价策略选择:一种捆绑视角

Optimal Pricing Strategy for Monopoly Software as a Service Vendor:A Bundling Perspective

软件即服务是云计算背景下捆绑IT基础设施和软件并通过互联网递交服务的一种新的IT服务形式。基于服务内容捆绑特性,研究垄断软件供应商面临捆绑定价策略和分开定价策略时的策略选择问题。通过建立模型并应用价格优化方法得出了两种策略下软件供应商的最优价格和最大利润,分析了供应商进行不同策略选择的边界条件。运用数值模拟探讨了供应商利润最大化策略选择对消费者剩余和社会福利的影响。研究发现捆绑策略并不一定损害消费者剩余,当服务可变成本较低时,利润最大化策略和社会福利最大化策略在捆绑策略处取得一致,并处于较高水平;当服务可变成本较高时,在分开定价策略处取得一致,并处于较低水平。供应商可通过不断降低可变成本提高利润及福利水平。

Software as a Service is essentially a bundling of a software product and its delivery and maintenance services. This study considers two pricing strategies, i.e., bundle pricing and separate pricing. Under these strategies, it calculates the optimal price and maximum profit of the software vendors, and analyzes the boundary conditions of different pricing strategies. Finally, it uses numerical simulation to explores how strategic options to maximize the profits of vendors influence consumer surplus and social welfare. It shows that bundling strategy does not necessarily harm consumer surplus, and when the service variable cost is low, the profit maximization strategy and social welfare maximization strategy reach a consensus in the bundling strategy and at a high level.When the service variable cost is high, the profit maximization strategy and social welfare maximization strategy reach a consensus in the separating strategy and at a low level. Thus vendors need to continuously reduce variable costs to improve profits and welfare.