政府补贴、两权分离与企业技术创新

Government subsidies,separation of ownership and control,and technological innovation

技术创新文献对政府补贴究竟是激励效应还是挤出效应尚无定论。本文结合资源基础理论和委托代理理论提出了一个权变的观点,即认为政府补贴能否有效地促进企业的技术创新在很大程度上取决于企业能否处理好两个层面的委托代理关系:一方面是企业管理层和企业股东之间的利益冲突(所有权与管理权的两权分离);另一方面是企业控股股东和中小股东之间的利益冲突(现金流权与控制权的两权分离)。本文对2008-2011年在沪深两市上市的电子、制药和信息企业创新绩效(运用随机效应负二项回归模型)进行分析后发现:第一,企业获得的政府补贴与其技术创新绩效之间不存在显著的正相关关系;第二,企业CEO两职合一、控股股东所有权和控制权的两权分离对政府补贴和技术创新绩效之间的关系起到负向的调节作用。本文的研究结果对政府的研发补贴政策和企业的治理结构调整具有一定的理论指导意义。

The literature on technological innovation provides no consensus on the motivation vs. crowding-out effect of government subsidies. This study proposes a contingency perspective on the basis of the resource-based view and principal-agency theory,suggesting that whether government subsidies facilitate technological innovation is dependent upon two principal-agent relationships: the conflict of interests between managers and owners and the conflict of interests between majority shareholders and minority shareholders. By analyzing firms from the electronics,pharmaceutical and information technology between 2008 and2011,this study finds out that: first,there is no significant and positive relationship between government subsidies and technological innovations; second,CEO duality and the separation of ownership and control rights negatively moderate the relationship between government subsidies and technological innovations. These findings provide important guidance for governmental policies and corporate governance.