实用性标准、创新激励与社会福利

The utility standard,innovation incentive and social welfare

实用性标准主要限制累积创新过程中阶段性成果的专利可获性。建立两阶段创新博弈模型进行一般均衡分析,结果表明:放宽实用性标准,企业更倾向于以专利形式、而非商业秘密形式持有先期创新成果。宽标准下,后续创新企业让渡的专利使用费将增加先期创新企业的预期利润,这虽然有助于增加先期创新投资,却不利于后续投资,由此专利转让费必须在合理范围之内,才能保证企业参与创新活动。在这一前提下,专利授权带来的创新分工和竞争性市场结构,将提高企业预期利润总和与消费者剩余,即放宽实用性标准,获得的社会福利更高。当先期创新成果难度偏高或溢出效应较大时,采取宽标准尤为有利。

Utility Standard is the main factor limiting intermediate research of cumulative innovation patented.Based on a two-stage model of innovation game,Analysis of general equilibrium show that research findings in initial innovation would be held in patent rather than trade secrets as the Utility Standard relaxed.And this choice increases the initial innovation investment,while decreasing the sequential investment because the latter innovators must pay royalties to the former.Therefore,patent transfer fee must be kept within reasonable limits to ensure the enterprises participate in innovation.Under this condition,strengthen patentability of intermediate research might improve social welfare i.e.business profits and consumer surplus through accelerating innovative division and forming competitive market.Meanwhile,relaxing Utility Standard would be particularly advantageous when initial innovation is extremely difficult or its spillovers effect is significant.