公立医院利益相关者演化博弈均衡研究

Analysis on Evolution Game Equilibrium on the Stakeholders of Public Hospitals

目的:深入探讨公立医院利益相关者演化博弈如何实现均衡。方法:采用复制动态演化博弈模型进行深入探究,进而勾画出公立医院利益相关者的演化博弈路径;基于演化博弈理论,就公立医院利益相关者的利益进行分析,用复制动态演化博弈模型来求解如何使其相互之间的利益达到均衡。结果:公立医院与利益相关者之间通过学习与协调,优化其决策,使得利益博弈均衡点均趋向于不同均衡结果,当增加时,演化博弈均衡点收敛于和的概率增加;当变大时,演化博弈均衡点向和收敛的概率也会变大。结论:利益博弈均衡点取决于两个因素:一是博弈双方起始状态;二是博弈双方学习调整的速度;公立医院与其利益相关者之间进行演化博弈过程中,最终收敛于不同均衡的概率取决于系统演化的各参数。

Objective:To further investigate how the evolutionary game of public hospitals' stakeholders realize the equilibrium.Methods:The replication dynamic evolution gaming model was applied to process further analysis, so as to draw the evolution gamingpath of relevant stakeholders of public hospitals; the benefits of stakeholders in public hospitals were analyzed, replication dynamicevolution gaming model was applied to solve how the benefits of the stakeholders could reach balance.Results:Through learning andcoordination between public hospitals and stakeholders, the decision was optimized so that the interest game equilibrium tended to dif-ferent equilibrium results. When increase, the probability of evolutionary game equilibrium convergence as and increases; when in-crease, the probability of evolutionary game equilibrium increase to the point of convergence as and increase.Conclusion:Studyfound that the interests of the game equilibrium depended on two factors: the first one was the start state for both sides of game; thesecond was the speed of the both sides learn to adjust; public hospitals and the stakeholders finally depended on different balance ofprobability in the process of evolutionary game, which depended on different indicators of systematic evolution.