技术溢出效应下供应商与政府的研发补贴策略

Supplier and government R&D subsidization in the presence of technological spillovers

通过构建多阶段博弈模型,同时考虑了横向技术溢出效应以及供应链伙伴之间的创新"双重边际效应"这两种影响企业创新积极性的因素,分析了两种不同的研发模式(非合作研发或者合作研发)下激励制造商创新的两种策略——供应商研发补贴和政府研发补贴。研究发现,政府研发补贴策略相比供应商研发补贴策略的优势主要体现在两个方面,一是政府补贴力度总是大于供应商补贴力度,从而能更有效地激励制造商研发、改进社会福利;二是政府补贴策略在制造商非合作研发或者合作研发时能达到相同的市场均衡结果,而供应商补贴策略的效果受到制造商研发模式的影响。此外,供应链各主体对于不同研发补贴策略的偏好不一致。

This paper considers two factors which may weaken firms' innovation enthusiasm,including horizontal technological spillovers between competitive firms and 'double marginal effect'of innovation between supply chain partners. By constructing and solving several multi- stage games,we analyze and compare two R&D subsidy policies,that's,supplier subsidization and government subsidization,under two R&D modes of manufacturers( i. e.,non- cooperative or cooperative R&D). Two significant advantages of government subsidies are found. First,since the government always offers a greater R&D subsidy compared with the supplier,it can promote innovation and improve social welfare more effectively. Second,subsiding non- cooperative and cooperative R&D by the government leads to the same market outcome,while the effect of supplier subsidization depends on manufacturers' R&D modes. In addition,different participants in the supply chain have inconsistent preferences for different R&D subsidy policies.