论作为意志自决之反身性的意志自由概念

On the Freedom of Will:a Reflexive Concept of the Self-determination of Will

意志是行为者导向有意图行为的心理机能或精神功能,它表现为行为者内心关于做某事的抉择,通常被认为受行为者的自我决定因而是自由的。在思想史上,古希腊的理性哲学、基督教的神学体系、德国观念论的启蒙哲学乃至后启蒙时代的存在主义哲学,都曾为作为意志自决或意志自律的意志自由概念提供论证。但是,这些论证均无法彻底回避和消除决定论尤其是社会文化决定论的可能。所以,我们只能在一个广义的相容论框架内来考虑这个概念。意志自由不在于意志自决,而在于行为者总可以对自决或不自决的意志进行再度评判、调控或修正,予以相应的促进或阻止,并提供意志诉求的其他可能。意志自由是对意志自决的反思和反作用,它应当在意志自决之反身性的意义上被理解。

Will refers to a psychological or mental function, and an attribute of acts intentionally com-mitted, which is present for agents in their mind to act decisively agents, considered as free because agentsdetermine their own acts. In intellectual history, the ancient Greek philosophy of rationalism, Christian theol-ogy, German idealism, and even existentialism in post-enlightenment era all argue for the notion of the free-dom of will related to the self-determination and the self-discipline of will. However, all the arguments failto rule out the possibility of determinism, sociol-cultural determinism in particular. Therefore, the conceptcan only be discussed with the framework of a broad compatibilism. The freedom of will is both the reflectionand the counteraction of the self-determination of will, so it should be understood in the sense of reflexivityof the self-determinism of will.