摘要
英国哲学家以赛亚·伯林(Isaiah Berlin,1909-1997)提出了一种独特的价值理论。这种理论关注的焦点不是“善”与“恶”之间的不可相容性和不可通约性,而是“善”与“善”之间的不可相容性和不可通约性。伯林把它视为当代哲学的核心难题。这个难题表现为两个方面,
This paper explores the problematic of Isaiah Berlin's values-pluralism and its
criticism from other contemporary philosophers. The main issue of Berlin's values-plu-
ralism is not the incommensurability and incompatibility between 'virtues' and 'e-
vils', but the incommensurability and incompatibility between different 'virtues'
Berlin takes this issue as the central problematic faced by contemporary Western philos-
ophy. He not just realizes this real problem, but also wants to avoid skepticism, rela-
tivism and subjectivism. For the question that 'is there really no right answer in hard
cases', He provides a negative answer, and makes the incommensurability and incom-
patibility between 'virtues' become the 'unresolved' problematic. Therefore, John
Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Robert Nozick, Richard Rorty and many other modern philos-
ophers tries their best to resolve this problem but with no successful conclusions finally.
Berlin's philosophy has some similarity with that of Frankfurt School, structuralism and
post-structuralism, and new pragmatism. With the characteristics of vivid 'rebelling',
Berlin's doctrine has become one important branch of the contemporary Western phi-
losophy.
出处
《哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第7期72-78,共7页
Philosophical Research