当前国有银行改革的政策风险与政策启示——兼论外汇储备注资的货币扩张效应

The New Strategy of China's State - owned Banks Reform: Risk and Implications

当前以外汇储备注资开始的国有银行改革试点蕴含着很高的政策风险。在微现层面,政府所有(或控制)的股权结构能否衍生出健康良好的银行公司治理机制,能否真正划清政府与银行之间的界限,本身存在疑问;在宏观层面,货币化的操作方式会加剧甚至诱发宏观不稳定。国有银行的风险归根结底是一种系统性的制度风险,是一种道德风险,最终要通过全面的体制转轨和健康、持续的经济增长来消化。

China's banking risk is mainly driven by moral hazard, which is due from state ownership deficiency in corpo- rate governance. The ongoing reform strategy for State - owned banks adopted by the government aims at the right target, but fails to follow a right way. Given that the government continues to hold the control right of the banks, there is no evidence showing that recapitalization and IPO will lead to sound practices for banking gov- ernance. Furthermore, in order to accelerate the recapitalization process, the reformers injected a lot of foreign exchange reserve into State - owned bank system, which consequently expands money supply and hurts the sus- tainability base of future economic growth. Our conclusion is that, no matter how serious the problem seems to be, risk does not equal to reality. China's banking reform should be in line with the rate of progress of total economic reform and the external environment, and the reformers should always keep in mind that the sustain- ability of future economic growth is the last means by which we can cushion and absorb the banking risk