基于权益不对称下股权融资机制设计

The Equity Financing Mechanism Design Based on Asymmetry Equity

上市公司控制人与其他市场参与者尤其是流通股东的权益具有非对称性特征,这种非对称性利于上市公司在融资和再融资时侵犯中小投资者利益。核准制基本解决了股份公司一级市场融资的制度设计;本文从防止上市公司控制人侵害中小股东权益和最低机制运行成本角度,设计并分析了几套上市公司二级市场再融资方案。

The equity asymmetry characterizes the relationship of the controllers of listed companies with participants of other markets, especially with the shareholders of flowing shares, so it prompts the listed companies to damage the interests of small-medium investors during the course of financing and refinancing. The system of sanction fundamentally figures out the system design of new issue of financing in the primary market. From the perspective of preventing the controllers of listed companies from damaging the equities of small-medium shareholders and also from the optimal operation cost, this article contrives and analyzes several refinancing projects in the secondary market of listed companies.