人力资本间接定价和剩余索取权安排

Indirect Pricing of the Human Capital and the Allocation of Residual Rights in Venture Capital

本文在间接定价理论基础上将逆向选择和道德风险纳入在一个模型中,通过甄别和激励的权衡解释了风险投资中的剩余索取权安排和报酬业绩敏感性的分布及变化规律。模型表明,剩余如何分享要综合考虑逆向选择和道德风险,两者相对重要性的变化决定了风险投资合约中报酬绩效敏感性的分布和变化:事前信息越重要且不对称程度越高,报酬绩效敏感性越低;代理人的努力越重要且事后信息不对称程度越高,报酬绩效敏感性越高。

This paper includes the adverse selection and morals hazard in a model on the basis of indirect pricing theory. It explains the allocation of residual rights in venture capital and the distribution and change of the pay-performance sensitivity by the trade-off of screening and incentives. The model indicates that how to share the residual is decided by comprehensive considering adverse selection and moral hazard. The distribution and change of the pay-performance sensitivity depends on the change of the relative importance of them: the more important and adverse the ex ant information, the less sensitive the pay-performance; the more important the effort of the agent and the more adverse of ex post information, the more sensitive the pay-performance.