期刊文献+

公司治理机制选择的权变性分析

The Selection of Corporate Governance Mechanism:A Contingency Analysis
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摘要 本文从管理学的权变理论角度 ,对公司治理机制的安排问题进行了比较深入的探讨。文章的分析结果表明 ,公司治理机制不仅受到特定国家的法律制度、经济发展水平、融资结构以及文化等宏观因素的影响 ,而且就具体的公司来说 ,由于其自身的经营目标、所处的发展阶段、行业以及所面临的现实财务状况的不同 ,同样要求采用不同的治理结构。 From the perspective of contingency theory,this paper has explored the choice problem of corporate governance. It is shown that corporate governance not only depends on the macro-factors such as the country's legal system,level of economic development level,financial structure and culture etc.,but also lies on the firm's operation objectives,product stage,industry characters and specifically financial condition.
作者 蔡祥
出处 《财经科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2004年第5期20-24,共5页 Finance & Economics
关键词 公司治理 权变理论 机制选择 Corporate governance Contingency theory Choice of mechanism
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参考文献15

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