公司代理权争夺问题新探

代理权争夺作为公司控制权更迭机制面临的最主要的问题是争夺者如何使股东相信自己比现任管理者更加有能力来改善公司经营绩效 ,从而惠泽股东 ;另外 ,代理权争夺的价值溢出以及公司控制权私人利益也是两个无法回避的问题。这些缺陷加大了代理权争夺在实践中的应用局限性。

This paper evaluates proxy fights voting only as one of the primary mechanisms for changing management or obtaining control in publicly traded corporations with dispersed ownership. The paper tries to find substantial shortcomings of proxy fights that limit the use of such contests in practice. Then it makes a brief analysis on the causes of mentioned shortcomings.